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THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATIONS  
OF MILESIAN THOUGHT  
 ALEX PRIOU 
Then they turned to political matters and invented laws and all the 
things that bring cities together, and such thought, in turn, they 
called wisdom.  For of such a sort were the seven wise men, who 
discovered certain political virtues.  Then, going further on down the 
road, they proceeded also to the bodies themselves and the nature of 
their production, and this is more properly called natural inquiry, and 
we say these sorts are wise with respect to the things concerning 
nature.1 
I 
ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONAL VIEW, philosophy dawned on the West 
in a city in present-day Turkey called Miletus and in the thought of a 
man of legend named Thales.2  There for the first time in our tradition, 
human beings dared to give accounts rather than tell stories about the 
origin and foundations of the world, to engage in cosmology and 
 Correspondence to: Alex Priou, 61 Hillside Dr., Greenwich, CT 06830; 
alexpriou@gmail.com. 
1 John Philoponus, Introduction to the Arithmetic of Nicomachus I, in 
The Works of Aristotle Volume XII: Select Fragments, ed. David Ross (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1952), 1.41–7.  All translations are my own.  For the fragments 
of Thales and Anaximander, I have used The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy 
Part I, ed. Daniel Graham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and 
provided the citation of the original text, followed parenthetically with “G” for 
Graham, then Graham’s abbreviations (“Ths” for Thales and “Axr” for 
Anaximander), and finally a fragment number.  When the text cited includes 
but exceeds Graham’s selection, I have prefaced the citation of Graham with a 
greater-than symbol (“>”); when Graham’s selection includes but exceeds the 
text cited, I have prefaced the citation of Graham with a less-than symbol (“<”).  
For Heraclitus, I have used Miroslav Marcovich, Heraclitus: Greek Text with a 
Short Commentary (Merida: Venezuela, 1967) for the numbering and text, with 
the traditional Diels-Kranz numbering given in parentheses, for example, 
“Heraclitus, M43 (DK 47).”  All other citations are to the Oxford Classical Texts 
editions of those works. 
2 Simplicius, Physics 23.29–33 (G.Ths.13); Hippolytus, Refutation of All 
Heresies 1.1.1 (< G.Ths.20). 
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cosmogony.3  However crude their accounts may have been, however 
much they may have adopted their predecessor’s mythology and 
superstition, beneath this fumbling and residue was a shift seismic and 
enduring.  For with these Milesian thinkers, man relied no longer on the 
traditional stories told of our beginnings and of the structure of the 
κόσμος—on the tales told by Hesiod, in particular—but on what was 
accessible to human reason alone. 4   Cosmogony replaced theogony; 
cosmology, the rule of Zeus. 5   But this is not the core of Hesiod’s 
thought.  Hesiod singles himself out by name as the bearer of a poetic, 
distinctly human wisdom that contrasts in its weakness with the 
powerful, divine wisdom of Zeus.6  Hesiod’s distinction between human 
and divine wisdom is a crucial premise of his worldview, a premise not 
conditioned on the myths he relates, but rather they on it.  So even if the 
myths—myths Hesiod himself likely did not believe7—were not empi-
rically grounded, nevertheless this core premise of the weakness of 
human wisdom may very well have been and still be so grounded.  Given 
the basic contours of Hesiod’s thought, the first question philosophy 
would have to face is that of the limits of human wisdom, of whether 
3  Compare Keimpe Algra, “The Beginnings of Cosmology,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. Anthony A. Long 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 45–65, 45–49.  Robin Waterfield, The 
First Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3: the Milesians 
“wanted to give a comprehensive picture and explanation of the whole 
universe, from the largest scale down to everyday phenomena such as rain and 
mist and rainbows. At the very birth of science and philosophy, the daring of 
this enterprise is breathtaking.”  As Waterfield’s observation suggests, the 
humility of science arrived late on the scene, for at its inception science had to 
assume the same ambitions of what it sought to replace.  For Thales as 
discoverer of the whole, see Jon Lenkowski, “The Origin of Philosophy,” The 
St. John’s Review 37 (1986): 81–92, 81–82; Friedrich Nietzsche, The Pre-
Platonic Philosophers, trans. Greg Whitlock (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2001), 7–8, 27–28. 
4 Of course the actual exercise of human reason was not so clean, as is 
well-acknowledged.  Algra, “Beginnings,” 63, calls the Milesians 
“protoscientists” (compare 54).  For the most scientific interpretation, see 
Stephen White, “Milesian Measures: Space, Time, and Matter,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, ed. Patricia Curd and Daniel Graham 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 89–133. 
5  Compare Malcolm Schofield, “The Ionians,” in Routledge History of 
Philosophy, Vol. I: From the Beginning to Plato, ed. C. C. W. Taylor (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 47–87, 49. 
6 Compare Hesiod, Theogony, 1–23, Works and Days, 458–92.  
7 Compare Hesiod, Theogony, 22–28; Herodotus, Histories, 2.53.1–2. 
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man can overcome the ambiguities that pervade his experience and 
bridge thereby the divide with divine wisdom.  Only a thinker who 
confronted this question would properly have faced the challenge the 
prephilosophic worldview levels against the budding philosopher.  
In this article I will examine philosophy’s first steps into its proper 
domain by turning to the origins of the Milesian school in the figures of 
Thales and Anaximander.  Our guiding question will be whether their 
thought as it is available to us sufficiently addresses the worldview it 
seeks to replace.  I argue that these two thinkers’ attempt to bridge the 
divide between divine and human wisdom inadequately addresses the 
ambiguities characteristic of human wisdom.  Through an examination 
of the tension between Thales’ political wisdom and natural philosophy 
and, later, between Anaximander’s cosmology and cosmogony, we will 
see that their attempt to gain access to the ground of human experience 
will ignore a fundamental problem, namely, that the very nature of that 
ground is to be entirely other than, and so inexplicable in terms of, our 
experience.  As I will argue, these thinkers understand experience to be 
a variety of determinations of a more fundamentally indeterminate 
ground, while problematically attempting to give this indeterminate 
ground discursive determination. 8   After treating Thales and 
Anaximander in sections II and III respectively, I will conclude with 
some comment on how Hesiod represents this philosophical problem 
poetically and how Heraclitus appears to be the first thinker to confront 
the problem philosophically, inasmuch as his attempt to bridge the 
divide between divine and human wisdom always keeps one eye on the 
ambiguities that pervade human experience.  The thesis of the paper is 
8 At the outset, this account perhaps seems better suited to Anaximander 
than to Thales.  And though I will argue that they agree on this point in the 
course of the essay, perhaps at present we can rely on G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures 
on the History of Philosophy I: Greek Philosophy to Plato, trans. E. S. Haldane 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 177, who points out that, by 
claiming water to be the ἀρχή of all things, “Thales comprehends essence as 
devoid of form” (cf.180–1).  But I would also caution against the approach of 
Charles Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1960), 8, for whom “the name of Anaximander 
stands . . . as a symbol for the anonymous creative spirit of Ionian thought in 
the sixth century,” among whom he would include Thales.  While we may know 
too little to conclude anything firm about these early thinkers, we know too 
much simply to view their respective doctrines through the lens of whichever 
one contemporary scholars deem their greatest.  It is not negligible that after 
Descartes scholars are enamored with Anaximander, but guided by Plato we 
might be more interested in Thales.  
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that the prephilosophic worldview cannot be dismissed as mere 
superstition or mythology, for prephilosophic thinkers like Hesiod make 
substantive claims about the character and limits of human wisdom, 
claims that deserve attention if the origins of philosophy are to be 
philosophic—rational rather than simply willful.  For an immanent, 
philosophical critique of that worldview, we must turn not to Thales or 
Anaximander, these seminal, yet flawed thinkers, but to Heraclitus. 
II 
Thales.  Among the Milesian philosophers, Thales stands out for his 
political activity and practical wisdom, which together earned him a 
place among the legendary seven sages of Greece.  Among these sages, 
however, he is unique for his philosophic activity. 9   Thales thus 
possesses a duality that eludes simple taxonomy.  So diverse are Thales’ 
achievements, that many, in both ancient and modern times, have 
doubted the veracity of the feats attributed to him.10  While knowing 
precisely what he did and did not achieve is obviously important, Thales’ 
duality, as philosopher and statesman, is beyond doubt.11  We may with 
right, then, treat these tales as symptoms of an underlying condition and 
consequently wonder what sort of a man could cut such a figure that, 
9 The seven sages “were all essentially practical men who played leading 
roles in the affairs of their respective states, and were far better known to the 
earlier Greeks as lawgivers and statesmen than as profound thinkers and 
philosophers.”  D. R. Dicks, “Thales,” The Classical Quarterly 9 (1959): 294–
309, 298.  Compare Richard McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates, 2nd ed. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2010), 21. 
10 Dicks, “Thales,” gives an invaluable criticism of the “exaggerated views 
of Thales” common at the time.  I follow him on many points, but make the 
separate effort to present the character of Thales’ wisdom. 
11 Reviewing the early sources about Thales, Dicks concludes that “he had 
a reputation chiefly as a practical man of affairs, who was capable of giving 
sensible political advice . . . , was astute in business matters . . . , and had an 
inquiring turn of mind with a bent towards natural science and the ability to put 
to practical use whatever knowledge he possessed.”  Dicks, “Thales,” 297; 
compare 306.  Compare Algra, “Beginnings,” 49; G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The 
Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 83–
84; Patricia O’Grady, Thales of Miletus: The Beginnings of Western Science 
and Philosophy (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2002), ix. 
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mythical as it may be, still remains unique in the Greeks’ minds.12  Who 
could earn such a reputation, exaggerated or not? 13   Is there any 
connection between Thales the statesman and Thales the philosopher?  
As we will see in the course of this essay, the latter is an extension of 
the former, and in such a way that Thales illuminates the intentions of 
his follower Anaximander—perhaps even of the Milesian school more 
generally.  If we take τὸ καλόν in its whole range of applications, then 
Plutarch’s fictionalization of Thales reveals the intention of Milesian 
thought best when he says, “[I]t’s necessary for those content with 
safety without τὸ καλόν to rule (ἄρχειν) so many cattle, horses, and 
oxen, but not human beings.”14   That is, in the legendary Thales, we see 
not just a unique man’s paradoxical combination of political prowess 
and philosophic thought, but man raising himself above self-
preservation and into the range of distinctively human and manifestly 
higher endeavors, statecraft and cosmology alike. 
We do well to begin from the soil that fostered Thales, from what 
he held in common with the other seven sages, for Diogenes Laertius 
tells us that, “after political things, he engaged in inquiry (ἐγένετο 
θεωρίας) into nature.” 15   While the sense of ἐγένετο θεωρίας is 
ambiguous, the most literal translation of the entire clause is “he came 
to be among inquiry into nature,” and so we might translate it more 
idiomatically as “he arrived at inquiry into nature.”  Was natural science 
just another of Thales’ interests, or did his political activities compel 
him down this road?  Whatever the sense, Thales seems at some point 
to have transitioned from one to the other, and so it may be helpful to 
follow his admittedly faded footprints as best we can down this road.  
Aside from sharing with the seven sages a certain laconic style, of which 
12 Stanley Rosen, Essays in Philosophy: Ancient (South Bend, Ind.: St. 
Augustine’s Press, 2013), takes a similar approach, esp. 76 and following.  
Nietzsche, Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 7, rightly argues that “[t]he Greeks 
regarded Thales of Miletus as the first philosopher.  In itself it is arbitrary to 
say that so-and-so is the first and that before him there were no philosophers, 
for a type does not [come to] exist all at once.” 
13 “There must be a reason why all those stories were attributed to Thales 
and not to someone else.”  McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates, 31. 
14 Plutarch, Dinner of the Seven Sages, 147d. 
15 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, 
1.23: μετὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ τῆς φυσικῆς ἐγένετο θεωρίας. 
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Plato’s Socrates makes much,16 Thales was a statesman, and, if we trust 
Diogenes Laertius, “he seems, even among the statesmen, to have 
deliberated best.”17  Herodotus relates three stories about Thales in this 
vein.  The last is the most typical of the sages, for there Herodotus 
relates the advice not just Thales, but also Bias, another of the seven, 
respectively gave the Ionians.  Both men counsel the Ionians on how 
best to achieve political unity among themselves, preserving their 
freedom relative to one another and deliberating as a common body.18  
In the other two Herodotean passages, Thales uses his knowledge of 
nature in his political dealings.  In one, Thales predicts an eclipse, whose 
darkness stops a battle and thus prompts the combatants to negotiate a 
peace. 19   In the other, Thales diverts a river, so that Croesus, on a 
campaign against the Persians, may cross it.20  We find similar stories of 
applied natural knowledge elsewhere among the testimonia.21  While it 
is tempting to see in these stories little more than applied knowledge of 
nature, we must note that in each story nature obstructs political aims, 
so that Thales’ natural philosophy proves not simply convenient or 
useful, but necessary to successful political action.  Political life seeks 
to establish itself in opposition to nature, or rather strives toward the 
same effective capability and permanence as nature.  Another of the 
seven sages, Cleobolus, allegedly inscribed the following verses on 
Midas’s tomb: 
 
I am a bronzen maiden, and I lie upon Midas’s marker. 
So long as water flows, trees have grown tall, 
the rising sun shines, and the shining moon, 
the rivers run, and the sea crashes, 
remaining on his much lamented tomb, 
16  Plato, Protagoras 342a7–3b3.  Compare Nietzsche, Pre-Platonic 
Philosophers, 14–22. 
17 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, 
1.25. 
18 Herodotus, Histories, 1.170.1–3 (> G.Ths.3). 
19  Herodotus, Histories, 1.74.1–3 (> G.Ths.4).  For an extensive 
examination of Thales’ prediction, see White, “Milesian Measures,” 90–102. 
20 Herodotus, Histories, 1.75.1–5 (> G.Ths.6). 
21 Compare Seneca, Natural Questions, 4a.2.22 (G.Ths.22); Aëtius, P 4.1.1 
(G.Ths.23); Callimachus, Iambics, frag. 191, Pfeiffer (G.Ths.2). 
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I shall tell passersby that Midas rests here.22 
The wisdom of the seven sages attempts to achieve in the political world 
the same permanence seen in nature.  For Thales, however, the chief 
obstacle to political action is not human beings but the natural world.  
Here Plutarch’s fictionalization is again helpful.  In the Dinner of the 
Seven Sages, a certain Neiloxenos, a stranger from Egypt, falsely 
attributes to Thales the statement that the most paradoxical thing he 
has seen is a tyrant grown old.  Thales corrects him, saying, “I would 
wonder not at seeing a tyrant, but a pilot grown old.”23  Laws can tame 
only men; something further is necessary to tame the seas. 
Accordingly, it’s tempting to interpret Thales’ cosmology on the 
model of its modern counterpart, which Bacon and Descartes 
introduced as an attempt to become “as masters and possessors of 
nature.”24  While certainly some such aim is implicit, even manifest, in 
Thales’ political actions, he has far more ambitious aims for his 
cosmology.  To understand this ambition, let us follow Thales’ footsteps 
a little further along.  Later tradition holds that Thales traveled at some 
point to learn from the Egyptian priests their knowledge of mathematics 
and, perhaps, some philosophy. 25   His books, however, were all 
astronomical in character, if he wrote anything at all. 26   Beyond 
astronomy, Thales had a keen interest in cosmology and is noted for 
22 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, 
1.89–90.  Socrates humorously dismembers these verses for being written 
inorganically (compare Plato, Phaedrus 264d2–5).  
23 Plutarch, Dinner of the Seven Sages,147a–c. 
24 Bacon, New Organon, 1.3, 2.4; Descartes, Discourse on the Method, pt. 
6.  Compare Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. 14. 
25  Compare Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent 
Philosophers, 1.25, 27; Proclus, On Euclid, 65.3–11 (G.Ths.9); Aëtius, P 1.3.1, S 
1.10.12 (G.Ths.16); Plutarch, Dinner of the Seven Sages, 146e; compare 
Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1.981b10 and following.  Dicks is rightly critical of the 
tradition ascribing certain geometrical proofs to Thales, but does admit that 
“he may have possessed some mathematical knowledge of the empirical type 
of Egyptian or Babylonian mathematics.”  Dicks, “Thales,” 302–03.  Likewise 
Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 83–84; McKirahan, Philosophy 
before Socrates, 25–27. 
26  Compare Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent 
Philosophers, 1.23; Simplicius, Physics, 23.29–33 (G.Ths.13); Pliny, Natural 
History, 18.213 (G.Ths.27): quoque. 
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claiming that the earth rests in water, as though it were a ship.27  Water 
is essential not just to his astronomy, but also to his physics more 
generally.  His most famous claim, as related by Aristotle, is that water 
is the ἀρχή of all things.28  While his reasons for singling out water are 
unclear, Aristotle surmises that Thales “perhaps took this judgment 
from seeing that the nourishment of all things is moist.”29  Other authors, 
perhaps under Aristotle’s influence, give similar reasons.30  And while 
Aristotle gives other possible justifications, this seems to me closest to 
the mark, for to deduce that water is the ἀρχή of all things from the 
observation that it nourishes many things implies that everything 
requires nourishment, is therefore alive, and thus has a soul.31  That is, 
it implies another of Thales’ core views, in which water bears a 
connection to soul and the divine.  Among the versions of this view that 
come down to us, we hear that “a divine power pervades the moist 
27 Compare Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.13.294a28–33 (G.Ths.18); Seneca, 
Natural Questions, 3.14.1 (G.Ths.19); Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 
1.1.2 (< G.Ths.20). 
28 Schofield argues that “modern scholarship takes it to be much more 
likely that the role Thales assigned to water was—as with Anaximander’s 
infinite—that of ἀρχή in a different and earlier sense: the origin of things, 
where and what they came from.”  Malcolm Schofield, “APXH,” Hyperboreus 3 
(1997): 218–35, 219; compare McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates, 29–30.  
Schofield presumes that the use of ἀρχή is Thales’, and not Aristotle’s 
application of a later term to an earlier thinker’s thought, a tendency of 
Aristotle’s that Schofield acknowledges.  Schofield “APXH,” 220; compare Kirk 
and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 87–89; McKirahan, Philosophy before 
Socrates, 27–28.  While interpreting ἀρχή as “beginning” rather than “principle” 
situates Thales more neatly between the Hesiodic and Orphic theogonies, on 
the one hand, and Anaximander’s cosmogony, on the other, there is no 
evidence that Thales intended to craft a cosmogony.  Accordingly, the most 
judicious conclusion is that of Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 92–
93.  In the body of the text, I argue that Thales’ natural science develops out of 
his political thought, so that his concern is to make sense of his wisdom rather 
than the ultimate beginnings of the κόσμος.  As I intend to show, how Thales 
understands his wisdom has important cosmogonic implications, addressed by 
Anaximander, if not by Thales as well. 
29 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.3.983b22–3 (< G.Ths.15). 
30 Compare Aëtius, P 1.3.1, S 1.10.12 (G.Ths.16), where τρέφεται is used 
not only for plants, but also for the sun and stars; Simplicius, Physics, 23.21–29 
(G.Ths.17). 
31  Strange though these views may sound, we should not allow their 
strangeness to lead us to conclude hastily that “heady speculation, not 
ingenious observation, is now the order of the day.”  Schofield, “Ionians,” 43. 
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element, and so moves (κινητικὴν) it”;32 that god “formed the entirety 
of things from water”;33 that Thales “perhaps supposed all things are full 
of gods” because soul “is mixed in the whole”;34 and finally that “it seems 
(ἔοικε) Thales supposed the soul is a thing that induces motion 
(κινητικόν), since he says the lodestone has a soul, because it moves 
iron.”35  For Descartes, the mastery of nature is instrumental to the 
alleviation of man’s estate, with morality, mechanics, and medicine the 
fruits of physics: if psychology and engineering are not separate 
sciences, then the former is reduced to the latter.36  For Thales, no such 
distinction obtains, for everything has soul: statecraft is the model on 
which he builds his physics, engineering is a mode of persuasion, and 
both are united in a cosmology, in which water is the ἀρχή of all things. 
Thales’ cosmology, however, is not reductive, as some have 
claimed.37  He understands water to induce motion (κινητικόν), and so 
by extension to be soul.38  It is more accurate to say, then, that the 
political art has been extended to encompass what we would name 
separately as natural science.  To recall two of Herodotus’s stories, 
32 Aëtius, P 1.7.11, S 1.1.29b (G.Ths.37). 
33 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, 1.10.25 (G.Ths.36).  
34 Aristotle, On the Soul 1.5.411a7–8 (G.Ths.35). 
35 Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2.405a19–21 (G.Ths.34).  Aristotle appears to 
qualify his conclusion by introducing it with ἔοικε, but here he seems to mean 
this remark is an inference, an inference that, in my estimation, seems correct 
in spirit, if not also in its particular content (compare Kirk and Raven, 
Presocratic Philosophers, 95). 
36 On the mastery of nature as instrumental, see Descartes, Discourse on 
the Method, pt. 6; on the “tree” of philosophy, see Principles of Philosophy, 
“Letter”; and on the relationship of physics to psychology, see Discourse on the 
Method, pt. 5, Passions of the Soul, “Preface.”  And see, again, Machiavelli, The 
Prince, chap. 14. 
37 Consider McKirahan’s objection: “If everything is composed of water, 
how can there be different kinds of things in the world, some of them, such as 
fire, seemingly opposed to water?”  McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates, 29.  
Algra, “Beginnings,” 52–54, argues that Thales physicalized and depersonalized 
the divine, while personalizing matter by giving it “an intrinsic principle of 
change.”  But if matter has soul, then to physicalize is of necessity to 
personalize.  Compare Waterfield, First Philosophers, 3. 
38  Criticizing what he calls Diogenes’ “perversion” of Aristotle, Hegel, 
Lectures, 183, argues that Thales “expressed the Idea,” that is, “absolute form,” 
“generally as soul so that absolute essence should be the unity of simple 
essence and form.”  That is, “soul” would be an image for how simple essence 
always gives rise to form, an image possible only if the nature of soul is to give 
its internal simplicity an external definition. 
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Thales uses one and the same art, first, to divert the river so Croesus’s 
army could cross it and, second, to advise the Ionians on how to unify 
politically.  Some such intention seems to underlie Thales’ cosmology, 
and thus to be behind Thales’ duality of statesman and natural 
philosopher.  What unites statecraft and natural science in Thales’ mind 
is obscure, but the connection seems to lie in the character of the 
wisdom of the seven wise men.  Jean-Pierre Vernant’s characterization 
of this wisdom is especially helpful: 
Sophia was concerned not with the universe of physis but with the 
human world: the elements that made it up, the forces that divided it 
against itself, and the means by which they might be harmonized and 
unified so that their conflict might give birth to the human order of 
the city.  This early wisdom was the fruit of a long history, difficult 
and harsh, in which many factors were interwoven, but which from 
the start turned from the Mycenaean concept of the sovereign to seek 
another path.  The problems of power, of the forms it took and the 
factors that formed its substance, were immediately posed in new 
terms.39 
As Vernant goes on to elaborate, this wisdom establishes a κόσμος 
among men by reconciling conflicting interests.40  Uniquely among the 
seven sages, however, Thales understood this wisdom to be of τὸ 
κινητικόν, of what induces motion.  From his knowledge, not just of 
political affairs, but of physics, as well, he seems to have noticed the 
pervasiveness of τὸ κινητικόν and interpreted his art in the broadest 
manner possible, so that his cosmology in particular, if not Milesian 
cosmology more generally, emerged naturally from his self-
understanding.41  Accordingly, the core premise to Thales’ cosmology 
39  Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), 40.  Also on σοφία, see Nietzsche, Pre-Platonic 
Philosophers, 8–9: “I must emphasize that Thales was designated σοφός on 
entirely other grounds than [those invoked] when he was called the first 
philosopher,” that is, on the human world rather than the universe of φύσις, as 
Vernant puts it. 
40 Vernant, Origins, 69–75.  For a more extensive discussion of cosmic and 
democratic justice, see Gregory Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy, Vol. I: 
The Presocratics, ed. Daniel Graham (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 57–88. 
41 On the relation between fluidity and intelligibility in Thales’ thought, see 
Rosen, Essays, 85–86.  Hegel, Lectures, 176–77, argues that the principle of 
water is deduced from the fact that the gods swear their oaths by the water of 
Styx.  This interesting suggestion would indicate a providential or at least 
promissory character to Thales’ wisdom. 
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seems to be an ambitious conception of the power of human wisdom to 
discern and establish a κόσμος not just of men, but of things as a whole.  
Such would seem to be the necessary consequence of the apparent 
progress of Milesian philosophy’s demythologization of 
prephilosophical theogonies like Hesiod’s.  Thales unites the political 
and the natural into a singular wisdom that Hesiod had claimed to be 
the preserve of Zeus alone.42  The ordering of man and nature is thus no 
longer the work of divine providence, but rather human. 
The question of whether or not Thales’ thought constitutes 
progress over Hesiod’s thus turns on whether Thales is successful in 
uniting the political and the natural into a single realm governed by a 
single art.  At this point, we must add a final nuance to our portrait of 
this singular figure.  So far, we have emphasized Thales’ self-perceived 
competence in both political action and natural science.  Despite his 
reputation as a sage, however, he was occasionally characterized as 
somewhat detached from practical affairs.  Once, when his pursuit of 
philosophy was accused of uselessness, Thales used his knowledge of 
astronomy to predict a fruitful olive crop for the year, subsequently 
established an early monopoly on the oil presses, and was thereby able 
to make a large sum of money.43  That is, he studied without concern for 
narrower, practical aims, that is, at leisure like the Egyptian priests from 
whom later sources claim he learned.44  Uncertain of whether Thales had 
a family, Diogenes Laertius says he may have been μονήρης καὶ 
ἰδιαστής. 45   The most famous and illuminating of these anecdotes, 
however, comes from Plato’s Theaetetus, in which Thales is said to have 
incurred the mockery of a Thracian slave girl when, gazing up at the 
stars, he tripped and fell into a well.46  What initially appeared to be the 
deemphasis of political life in the broader context of the natural world 
and a consequent competence in the management of both, now slowly 
begins to appear as a rift.  Was Thales, the man with a singular art over 
42 Compare Hesiod, Works and Days, 483–84. 
43 Compare Aristotle, Politics 1.11.1259a5–21 (G.Ths.8); Plutarch, Solon, 
2.4 (G.Ths.10), Dinner of the Seven Sages,145d–e. 
44 Compare Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1.981b18–20 (< G.Ths.15). 
45 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, 
1.25. 
46  Plato, Theaetetus 174a4–8 (G.Ths.7).  Compare, however, Plato, 
Republic 600a4–7; Aristophanes, Birds, 1004–09, Clouds, 175–80. 
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τὸ κινητικόν, really so impractical?47  Was his attempt to put into human 
hands a wisdom once deemed the preserve of the gods hubristic?  Did 
Thales’ ambitions for his wisdom get the better of his judgment? 48  
Directed away from the man and back to his thought, we may seek 
guidance in Aristotle’s appraisal of Anaximander’s innovation over his 
predecessor, that if the ἀρχή of all things is a particular element, as it is 
for Thales, then it would have destroyed its contrary entirely, which is 
manifestly not the case.49  Thales’ cosmology might ultimately say more 
about the man than it does about the κόσμος.  Anaximander’s reaction 
was to work to develop a coherent cosmology, to which we will 
momentarily turn.  Guided by Hesiod, however, we might instead judge 
Thales’ stumble as the foolhardy attempt to overcome the weakness of 
human wisdom. 50   To recall Plutarch’s Thales, this paradoxical and 
seminal figure not only exposes the broader range of meanings of τὸ 
καλόν, but himself falls prey to the beautiful but hubristic deception of 
a cosmically competent art.  As Aristotle says of Thales’ monopoly on 
the oil presses, people understood Thales “to have made a show of his 
wisdom.”51 
III 
Anaximander.  Nevertheless, Anaximander took another road, and 
with him natural science emerges for the first time as a separate art from 
that of politics.  Because of his critique of and advance beyond Thales, 
Anaximander has rightly earned among ancient and modern 
commentators alike his reputation as a formidable natural scientist.52  
Likewise, he is praised for his account of the equilibrium of the earth at 
47  Many note Plato’s counterintuitive characterization of Thales in the 
Theaetetus without commenting on his more familiar characterization in the 
Republic.  I attempt to make some sense of this duality, noted by Plato, in the 
body of the text.  See Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 78–79. 
48 Compare Plato, Laws 899b3–c1. 
49 Aristotle, Physics 3.5.204b22–29 (G.Ths.17). 
50 Compare Herodotus, Histories 1.75.1–78.2 (> G.Ths.6). 
51 Aristotle, Politics 1.11.1259a19 (< G.Ths.8): ἐπιδείξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς 
σοφίας (emphasis mine). 
52 Compare Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 112–14; Schofield 
“APXH,” 218.  Against this view, see Martin Heidegger, The Beginning of 
Western Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 6–7, 26. 
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the center of the cosmos,53 his rudimentary version of an evolutionary 
theory, 54  and general reliance on experience in the navigation of 
theoretical questions. 55   At the same time, however, his views are 
referred to variously as imaginative, inventive, and even poetic for their 
use of similes, metaphors, and anthropomorphic language to relate his 
cosmogony and cosmology.56  While in some instances Anaximander 
recognizes that experience refutes or supports the use of this or that 
term as an explication of certain phenomena, in others he displays a 
marked lack of sensitivity to the terms he applies to other phenomena.  
The same man who insists on using an indefinite term for the indefinite 
ἀρχή of all things readily speaks of the world in terms of wheels and 
whistles.  The traditional view of Anaximander’s thought thus suggests 
two contrary elements in his character, the scientist and the artist.57  As 
with Thales’ duality as statesman and philosopher, again we ask what 
connection there is between the two Anaximanders. 
Let us begin with Anaximander the scientist, and first with his 
relationship to Thales.  Various sources refer to Anaximander as Thales’ 
student, successor, acquaintance, cocitizen, relative, and comrade. 58  
53  Compare Algra, “Beginnings,” 55; Kirk and Raven, Presocratic 
Philosophers, 134–35. 
54 Compare Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 142.  McKirahan, 
Philosophy before Socrates, 43, argues that, because Darwin’s theory differs 
from Anaximander’s, he should not be deemed “the father of evolution.”  But 
difference and even error are not sufficient on their own to exclude him from 
this tradition.  As Graham, Texts, 69, points out, “Anaximander recognizes a 
kind of progression of life, if not a systematic evolution of species.”  Compare 
Waterfield, First Philosophers, 8.  Against the attribution of any sort of 
evolutionary theory to Anaximander, see Kahn, Anaximander, 69–71. 
55 Compare Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 100; McKirahan, 
Philosophy before Socrates, 41. 
56 Compare Simplicius, Physics, 24.20–1 (< G.Axr.9); Graham, Texts, 69; 
Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 142. 
57 Compare Schofield, “Ionians,” 53.  Francis Cornford, “Was the Ionian 
Philosophy Scientific?” in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy Vol. 1: The 
Beginnings of Philosophy, ed. R. E. Allen and David J. Furley (New York: 
Routledge, 1970), 29, considers the scientific status of all Ionian cosmology 
questionable, though he phrases it in somewhat different terms. 
58 Agathemerus, Sketch of Geography, 1.1 (G.Axr.6): ἀκουστής; Eusebius, 
Praeparatio Evangelica, 10.14.11 (G.Axr.2): ἀκουστής; Pseudo-Plutarch, 
Miscellanies, 2 (G.Axr.19): ἑταῖρος; Strabo, Geographica, 1.1.11 (G.Axr.7): 
γνώριμος καὶ πολίτης; Simplicius, Physics, 24.14 (< G.Axr.9): διάδοχος καἰ 
μαθητής; Suda s.v. Anaximandros (G.Axr.4): συγγενὴς καὶ μαθητὴς καὶ 
                                                     
16   ALEX PRIOU 
While their actual relationship remains unclear, if not invented, 59 
Diogenes Laertius summarizes their intellectual relationship neatly as 
follows: Anaximander “claimed τὸ ἄπειρον is the ἀρχή and element, 
not defining it as air or water, or some other thing.”60  Without venturing 
just yet to understand what Anaximander means by τὸ ἄπειρον, let us 
simply note that he chooses an indefinite term over one that refers to a 
definite kind of thing. 61   Aristotle gives what he takes to be 
Anaximander’s reasons for choosing something indefinite as “the one 
and simple thing” from which everything else comes to be: 
There are some who make this thing τὸ ἄπειρον, but not air or water, 
so that everything else is not destroyed by τὸ ἄπειρον of these (sc. 
air or water): for they have opposition with respect to one another, 
e.g. air is cold, water moist, fire hot.  If one of these were ἄπειρον, 
διάδοχος.  “All these words imply a personal contact between a younger and 
an older man.”  Kahn, Anaximander, 28. 
59  “The arrangement of the early philosophers into ‘schools’, and into 
masters and pupils within these schools, was initiated by Theophrastus.”  Kirk 
and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 101 n. 2.  Compare Waterfield, First 
Philosophers, 3. 
60 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, 
2.1.  The references to wind and water seem to be to Anaximenes and Thales, 
respectively.  For a powerfully direct restatement of Anaximander’s innovation, 
see Hegel, Lectures, 186–87.  Diogenes Laetrius’s statement derives from 
Theophrastus’s lost work on the early Greek philosophers.  See the helpful 
juxtaposition of sources in Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 105–07.  
Kahn, Anaximander, 11–71, masterfully reconstructs Theophrastus’s 
statements on Anaximander by giving an extensive account of the relative 
reliability of the sources, followed by a comparative assessment of what they 
say about various themes of Anaximander’s thought. 
61  On the controversies surrounding the character of τὸ ἄπειρον, see 
Elizabeth Asmis, “What is Anaximander’s Apeion?” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 19 (1981): 279–97; R. M. Dancy, “Thales, Anaximander, and 
Infinity,” Apeiron 22 (1989): 149–90; Aryeh Finkelberg, “Anaximander’s 
Conception of the Apeiron,” Phronesis 38 (1993): 229–56; Graham, Texts, 66–
67; Kahn, Anaximander, 231–39.  Against the impetus driving the debate, see 
Heidegger, Beginning, 26; McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates, 36.  My 
position is closer to that of Heidegger and McKirahan, for the emphasis on the 
otherness of τὸ ἄπειρον to our experience should duly caution us against the 
attempt to give it a determinate character.  As Waterfield, First Philosophers, 
5, judiciously notes, “perhaps [Anaximander] did not make [what he means by 
τὸ ἄπειρον] clear,” for, given the confused doxography, “it seems most likely 
that Anaximander said nothing definite about his boundless.”  Asmis may come 
close to Heidegger’s view, though it is unclear whether, by identifying τὸ 
ἄπειρον with “the infinite process of generation” (287), she means an infinite 
causal chain or the ground for the possibility of that chain.  
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everything else would already have been destroyed.  But now they 
say it is another thing, from which these things [come to be].62 
Similarly, Simplicius says of Anaximander that, “seeing the change 
(μεταβολὴν) of the four elements into one another, this man did not 
deem any one of them worthy of being made the underlying thing, but 
something else aside from these.”63  Thales’ claim that all is water, even 
in its nonreductive interpretation, fails to account adequately for the 
heterogeneity of experience, including the succession of opposites.  If 
the ἀρχή of all things is something definite with an opposite, then the 
change from it into its opposite is impossible, unless it somehow is its 
opposite.  And, as Aristotle’s examples show, the move to something 
altogether indefinite, to τὸ ἄπειρον, guarantees that we avoid the 
complex way in which this problem might arise: fire’s heat is contrary 
not just to air’s coolness, but also to water’s moistness.  Anaximander 
thus saw in Thales’ natural science a failure to recognize that what 
unifies all things must be, in Aristotle’s words, something ἕτερον—
indeed, inasmuch as it can be nothing definite, it must be altogether 
ἕτερον.  Whereas Thales posited water as the ἀρχή of all things from 
his understanding of his wisdom’s power, Anaximander sees through 
this projection’s argumentative flaws and corrects his predecessor’s 
account. 
Anaximander’s correction, like all corrections, innovates beyond, 
while being indebted to, his predecessor’s thought.  Anaximander, no 
less than Thales, seeks the unity of things in their ἀρχή.  And though 
this ἀρχή does not unify the wisdom of the statesman and the engineer 
as vividly as that of Thales, it nevertheless unifies Anaximander’s 
wisdom by unifying his object of contemplation.  We might ask, 
therefore, whether Anaximander, like Thales, projects unity onto the 
world in order to bring unity to himself, and so whether the problem of 
cosmology as it manifested itself in Thales is more complex than we 
earlier surmised.  Toward this end, let us consider the role Anaximander 
intends τὸ ἄπειρον to play in his cosmology.  As Simplicius and 
Aristotle noted, the changing over (μεταβολή) of one element into 
another led Anaximander to reject water as the ἀρχή of all things.  This 
62  Aristotle, Physics 3.5.204b24–9 (< G.Axr.17).  Compare Turba 
Philosophorum, 109.20–110.1 (G.Axr.29). 
63 Simplicius, Physics, 24.21–2 (G.Axr.9). 
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leads to the conclusion, articulated by Diogenes Laertius, that, “while 
the parts change (μεταβάλλειν), the whole is unchanging 
(ἀμετάβλητον).”64  Anaximander’s ἀρχή can bring unity to cosmology 
only by making that unity other than its constituent parts.  Whereas our 
experiences of water and soul made Thales’ identification or collapse of 
the two at least partially, if not altogether, intelligible, Anaximander 
posits something so other than our experience that it is unclear what, if 
any, explanatory purpose it might serve.  Speaking of those who posit 
τὸ ἄπειρον as the ἀρχή of all things, Aristotle says, “they say it is 
something other (ἕτερον), from which these things [came to be].” 65  
Simplicius, too, notes that it is “some other, boundless nature (ἑτέραν 
τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον), from which [nature] all the heavens and the 
κόσμοι in them come to be.”66  Because the priority of τὸ ἄπειρον as the 
ἀρχή of all things cannot be based in experience, it is instead based in 
logical necessity, inasmuch as our experience could not be such as it is 
without such an ἀρχή.  Consequently, τὸ ἄπειρον is both structurally 
and temporally prior to all things; it is first both cosmogonically and 
cosmologically.  Whereas it is debatable whether Thales had a 
cosmogony, there is no question with Anaximander.  Thus in the 
tradition ἀρχή explicitly means both “beginning” and “principle” in 
reference to the latter’s thought.  In fact, oftentimes it means only 
“beginning,” with various authors referring to τὸ ἄπειρον as both the 
ἀρχή and στοιχεῖον of all things.67  Here, however, a problem presents 
itself.  Inasmuch as τὸ ἄπειρον is the “principle” or “element” of all 
things, it does not change, but its parts do.  And yet, inasmuch as it is 
the “beginning” of all things, must it not change, if something other than 
it is to have come to be? 
Looking to Anaximander’s cosmogony with this question in mind, 
we can begin to understand what he means by τὸ ἄπειρον and, 
specifically, why it proves so elusive to understand.  None of the sources 
on Anaximander refers to the beginning of the cosmogonical process as 
64 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, 
2.1. 
65 Aristotle, Physics 3.5.204b29 (< G.Axr.17). 
66 Simplicius, Physics, 24.17–18 (< G.Axr.9). 
67 Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.6.1–2 (G.Axr.10); Simplicius, 
Physics, 24.14–15, with 24.16–17: λέγει δ᾽ αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν 
καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων (< G.Axr.9).  Compare Schofield, “APXH,” 218. 
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a μεταβολή.  The preferred term is “separating off,” ἀπόκρισις or 
ἀφαίρεσις.68  But division or separation seems insufficient for making 
the indefinite definite.  Aëtius criticizes Anaximander on precisely this 
point: 
He speaks thus of why it is ἄπειρον, so that in no way does the 
coming-into-being supported by it cease.  But this man errs by not 
saying what τὸ ἄπειρον is, whether it is air or water or earth or some 
other bodies.  Thus he errs, because, on the one hand, he asserts it is 
matter, but, on the other, he abolishes the efficient cause.  For τὸ 
ἄπειρον is nothing other than matter, but the matter cannot be 
actualized unless the efficient is presupposed.69 
To translate this out of Aristotelian terminology, something other than 
what is indefinite is necessary if something definite is to come into 
being.70  Yet, according to Pseudo-Plutarch, Anaximander nevertheless 
maintained that “τὸ ἄπειρον has the entire cause (τὴν πᾶσαν αἰτίαν) 
of both the coming-into-being and [the] destruction of the all.” 71  
Continuing, he writes that Anaximander “says that that of the eternal 
(sc. τὸ ἄπειρον) which causes both hot and cold to come-into-being 
separated off at the coming-into-being of this κόσμος.” 72   So, while 
Aëtius accuses τὸ ἄπειρον of being unable to initiate becoming, 
68  Aristotle, Physics 3.4.203b20 (< G.Axr.16): ἀφαιρεῖται; Pseudo-
Plutarch, Miscellanies, 2 (G.Axr.19): ἀποκεκρίσεσθαι, ἀποκριθῆναι.  
Compare Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.6.4 (< G.Axr.20): 
ἀποκριθέντα.  In Simplicius, Physics, 24.23–25 (< G.Axr.9), we read that the 
ἀπόκρισις occurs “because of the eternal motion.”  Hippolytus says the 
generation of the heavens follows from this same motion (Hippolytus, 
Refutation of All Heresies, 1.6.2 [< G.Axr.10]).  Graham, Texts, 19, suspects 
that the twice-mentioned eternal motion “may be an inference from vague 
evidence.”  Graham is likely right, but the salient point is really that the 
evidence is vague.  Whether we accept an eternal motion or not, the puzzle of 
how the indefinite becomes definite remains, for an eternal motion could just 
as conceivably produce no definition at all.  Waterfield, First Philosophers, 5, 
notes the puzzle of the process of ἀπόκρισις and even suggests 
(parenthetically) its poetic character, since it occurs “in an act which looks like 
little more than an abstraction of mythical masturbatory genesis by a single 
male god, especially since the word ‘separate off’ can also mean ‘secrete’.”  
Compare Kahn, Anaximander, 86–87. 
69 Aëtius, P 1.3.3, S 1.10.12 (< G.Axr.18). 
70  McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates, 37–38, underestimates how 
intractable this problem is. 
71 Pseudo-Plutarch, Miscellanies, 2 (G.Axr.19). 
72 Ibid.: φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀιδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ κατὰ 
τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι. 
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Pseudo-Plutarch shows us that we can correct this difficulty only by 
reading the definiteness of opposites back into τὸ ἄπειρον.  The 
intelligibility of τὸ ἄπειρον thus poses the following problem.  
Anaximander understands that if a definite substance like Thales’ water 
is the ἀρχή of all things, it would have consumed all things.  He thus 
chooses as his ἀρχή what is indefinite, τὸ ἄπειρον.  But precisely 
because τὸ ἄπειρον is completely other than our experience, any 
description of the process of generation would render the indefinite 
definite.  Thus τὸ ἄπειρον is entirely necessary as the ground of 
experience, but precisely because it is the ground of and not one thing 
among our experience, it is also necessarily mediated by our 
experience.  Aristotle summarizes the problem of access to this ground 
best, when he argues that “there isn’t any such sensible body (sc. τὸ 
ἄπειρον) alongside the so-called elements, for all things are from this 
and dissolve into this, so that it would be here alongside air, fire, earth, 
and water; but it in no way shows itself (φαίνεται).”73  In speaking of τὸ 
ἄπειρον as that from which all things come to be and into which they 
perish, Aristotle recalls the most extended, if not the only, fragment of 
Anaximander’s writing, in which he says that all things are generated 
from and perish back into the same thing, namely, τὸ ἄπειρον.74  How, 
then, does one define the indefinite, what demonstrably is, as ἀρχή, but 
is for that reason experientially absent?  The preceding suggests, and I 
propose, the following: τὸ ἄπειρον is what only shows itself as what is 
other than itself.75  Or, in the words of the first thinker to thematize this 
problem directly, Heraclitus the obscure, “nature loves to hide herself.”76 
For his part, however, Anaximander does not seem to have 
commented directly on the above problem.  His silence has left his 
thought ambiguous, and so has been the cause of some debate, even 
73 Aristotle, Physics 3.5.204b32–35. 
74 Simplicius, Physics, 24.18–19 (< G.Axr.9).  There is some debate about 
whether these words in particular are verbatim Anaximander’s.  Regardless, 
since other thinkers have held the contrary view—that things do not come into 
being from and perish into the same thing—the thought at least seems 
genuinely Anaximander’s. 
75 In the words of Hegel, Lectures, 187, “matter determined as infinitude 
means the motion of positing definite forms, and again abolishing the 
separation.  True and infinite Being is to be shown in this and not in negative 
absence of limit.” 
76 Heraclitus, M8 (DK 123). 
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among his ancient interpreters.  The language of the debate 
demonstrates the centrality and latency of this problem.  Alexander of 
Aphrodisias claims that Anaximander “set as ἀρχή the nature between 
(τὴν μεταξὺ φύσιν) both air and fire or both air and water, for it is said 
in both ways.”77  Alexander’s claim reminds us of Aristotle’s remark that 
Anaximander wished to avoid identifying the ἀρχή with anything that 
has a contrary.  As Alexander understands it, τὸ ἄπειρον is between the 
contraries, which would give it an indefiniteness that is nonetheless 
related to the definiteness of experience, and so able to act as an 
intelligible principle of both a cosmology and cosmogony.  And yet 
elsewhere Aristotle argues that the origin of all things cannot be 
“something between” (μέσον τι) contrary elements, since this is to 
qualify one contrary by a feature of the other and so to overlook the fact 
that one is the privation of the other.78  Aristotle thus concludes that, 
should τὸ ἄπειρον be something determinate with an opposite, it could 
not reside alone (μονοῦσθαι).  Still elsewhere, Aristotle says 
Anaximander doesn’t make this claim, but rather separates the 
contraries from what they are present in.79  Anaximander’s silence has 
left us with a confused doxography and, consequently, a lively scholarly 
debate regarding Anaximander’s true thought.  That this debate centers 
on the relation of definite contraries to an indefinite ground illustrates 
that the elusive manner in which τὸ ἄπειρον shows itself remains the 
puzzling issue at the core of these disagreements.  And to have a 
doxography be so confused on such an essential question bears witness 
to the decisive fact, that what was so explicitly a concern for 
Anaximander’s ancient and modern successors was not an explicit 
concern for Anaximander himself—even those with access to his 
writings, or at least Theophrastus’s summaries thereof, are at odds with 
one another.  We thus do well to ask what his explicit concern was.  With 
77  Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 
60.8–10 (G.Axr.12). 
78 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, 2.5.332a20–25 (< G.Axr.11).  
Graham, Texts, 67, points out that “Aristotle seems to vacillate between two 
interpretations of Anaximander’s boundless . . . assuming with Alexander that 
Anaximander is the one Aristotle has in mind in” the present fragment.  This 
would not mean Aristotle is inconsistent, but perhaps only uncertain and so 
inclined to different possibilities under differing circumstances, as is also the 
opinion of Waterfield, First Philosophers, 5.  Thus, as Graham, Texts, 67, notes, 
“Anaximander’s vagueness is judged a demerit” in Aëtius, P 1.3.3, S.10.12 
(G.Axr.18). 
79 Aristotle, Physics 1.4.187a12–23 (< G.Axr.5 + 13). 
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respect to his cosmology, logical necessity compels Anaximander to 
assert that the principle is indefinite, τὸ ἄπειρον, but not so far as to 
explore the problem of how the indefinite element or principle of his 
cosmology relates to the definition characteristic of our experience.  
And yet Anaximander can avoid the question for only so long, for 
cosmogony forces him to give a temporal or genetic account of how τὸ 
ἄπειρον comes to possess the definition of experience.  Looking more 
broadly, we can note that while Anaximander is sensitive to the form 
the ἀρχή must take if the heterogeneity of the κόσμος as we experience 
it is to continue to be, he isn’t sensitive to the form it must take if that 
heterogeneity is to come to be.  That is, despite his concern with 
cosmogony and so with γένεσις qua coming-into-being, Anaximander’s 
account of his ἀρχή only makes sense of γένεσις qua becoming.  
Anaximander thus betrays a prejudice toward cosmology that allows 
him to correct Thales’ error, but also leads him to ignore his own error, 
one most manifest in his cosmogony. 
By identifying this fundamental problem in Anaximander’s ἀρχή, 
we have ridden down his road to where Anaximander the scientist’s 
investigations stop and Anaximander the artist’s imagery begins.  And 
so here we may gain access to the impulse that guides his thinking as a 
whole.  Here it is helpful to begin from a feature of Anaximander’s 
cosmology that earns him praise as a natural scientist.  Whereas Thales 
had claimed the earth floated in water, Anaximander claims that it 
maintains an equal distance from everything and is supported by 
nothing.80  Commentators see in this “profound” revision of Thales’ view 
a judicious use of the principle of sufficient reason.81  While there may 
be grounds to doubt whether Anaximander here intends a revision of 
Thales’ view, nevertheless this element of his cosmology does not stand 
alone, but is part of a general, cosmic balance and equilibrium that 
extends much wider than the earth’s place in that κόσμος.82  Just as the 
80 Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.6.3 (< G.Axr.20). 
81 Compare Graham, Texts, 68; Kahn, Anaximander, 76–81; McKirahan, 
Philosophy before Socrates, 40–41, commenting on Aristotle, On the Heavens 
2.13.295b11–16 (< G.Axr.21); White, “Milesian Measures,” 104.  Against this 
view, see Schofield, “Ionians,” 45–49.  Compare Waterfield, First Philosophers, 
7. 
82 “For [Anaximander] it is equality and equilibrium which characterize the 
order of Nature.”  Kahn, Anaximander, 80.  Vlastos, Studies, 74–76, draws a 
connection between the balance of opposites in Anaximander and the 
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earth’s place is balanced, so too is the earth itself symmetrically 
balanced as a column with two faces opposite one another.83  Around 
the earth travel the sun, moon, and stars in even circles at set distances.84  
And Anaximander the scientist’s emphasis on balance and equilibrium 
provides the context for Anaximander the artist to put his poetic speech 
to work to paint a picture of this κόσμος.85  To describe the circular 
travel of the heavenly bodies, Anaximander uses the image 
(παραπλήσιος, ὅμοιος) of a wagon wheel (ἁρμάτειος τροχός).86  This 
image describes not only their motion, but also the way in which they 
light up, with the wheel’s hollow felloe (ἁψίς κοίλη) being full of fire.87  
Here Anaximander shifts his image, for the felloe is not just the place of 
the fire, but also that through which the fire shows itself (ἐκφαίνω).88  
Anaximander also calls this showing an exhalation (ἐκπνοή) and so 
uses the image (ὥσπερ, οἷον) of the pipe of a pair of bellows 
prevalence of symmetry in Homer and Hesiod.  McKirahan, Philosophy before 
Socrates, 39, notices that Anaximander’s cosmology has “a simple symmetric 
structure” (see 46: “a stable, ongoing system”), but is later skeptical, if 
Anaximander should indeed hold the world to perish (see 47).  But if 
regeneration is guaranteed, as McKirahan offers, there would still be some 
stability, albeit one of guaranteed perishing into and generation out of τὸ 
ἄπειρον.  For how this is a kind of stability, see the concluding section in the 
body of the text. 
83 Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.6.3 (< G.Axr.20). 
84 Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.6.4–5 (< G.Axr.20); Aëtius, P 
21.1 (G.Axr.23); P 2.16.5, S 1.24.2e (G.Axr.28). 
85 At one point in his discussion, Kahn, Anaximander, 95, asks the all-
important question, “Should this first attempt to fix the dimensions of the solar 
and lunar orbits, and, presumably, of the stellar rings as well, be considered as 
evidence of a mythic or a scientific point of view?”  Arguing in favor of “a 
rational element,” and so against deriving Anaximander’s ratios from “the poet 
in Anaximander,” Kahn concludes, “that the inspiration was essentially 
mathematical seems to me beyond reasonable doubt” (see 95–97).  But to speak 
of Anaximander’s motivation as “mathematical inspiration” seems not so much 
a solution to, as a restatement of the problem of the two Anaximanders.  A 
claimed and unjustified, but still delightful story about the mathematical 
regularity of the world would be a bizarre story, but a story nonetheless.  Plato 
has his Timaeus call his own version an εἰκὸς μῦθος (see Timaeus 68d2).  I do 
not think, however, as Kahn appears to, that this would preclude Anaximander 
from being called a mathematical physicist (see 97). 
86 Aëtius, P 2.20.1, S 1.25.1c (G.Axr.22); P 2.25.1, S 2.26.1a (G.Axr.25); P 
2.29.1, S 2.26.3 (G.Axr.27). 
87 Aëtius, P 2.20.1, S 1.25.1c (G.Axr.22); P 2.25.1, S 2.26.1a (G.Axr.25). 
88 Aëtius, P 2.20.1, S 1.25.1c (G.Axr.22); compare Aëtius, P 2.25.1, S 2.26.1a 
(G.Axr.25). 
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(πρηστῆρος αὐλός).89  Anaximander’s use of imagistic or poetic speech 
also influences his cosmogony.  In a punning image, Anaximander says 
that, after the initial, cosmogonic separating off, flame (φλόξ) grew 
around the air surrounding the earth just as bark (ὡς φλοιός) around 
trees.90  Anaximander found this image attractive enough to use it for his 
zoogony and, in a somewhat altered form, his anthropogony. 91  
Anaximander’s affinity for images, similes, and puns led Theophrastus, 
according to Simplicius, to refer to his words as “quite poetic” 
(ποιητικωτέροις).92  The impulse that guides Anaximander throughout 
his natural science and poetic speech is an affinity for balance and 
regularity, such as we find in the heavenly bodies.  Anaximander’s 
scientific investigations thus appear to stem from an attraction to the 
regularity of the κόσμος in our experience, specifically in our 
experience of the heavenly bodies.  And as we have seen, this attraction 
inclines him to apply to his cosmogony the same sort of poetic speech 
found in his cosmology.  
Consequently, despite his discovery of the structural and temporal 
priority of the indefinite over the definite, Anaximander appears 
unaware of the problem of access to the indefinite.  And this should by 
now be no surprise, for, if τὸ ἄπειρον is what shows itself only as what 
is other than itself, it defies explication in terms of balance and 
regularity.  Just as with the two Thaleses, then, the two Anaximanders 
do not quite jibe.  But if we follow Anaximander the artist further, we 
see the connection between these thinkers’ dualities is still more 
substantive than this.  Nowhere do we see Anaximander’s artistry more 
vividly than in his construction of a model of the κόσμος.  Agathemerus 
tells us that he was the first who “dared to draw the inhabited world 
(οἰκουμένην) on a tablet.”93  In his Geographica, Strabo says the tablet 
89  Aëtius, P 2.25.1, S 2.26.1a (G.Axr.25); Hippolytus, Refutation of All 
Heresies, 1.6.4 (< G.Axr.20).  On the difficulty of translating πρηστῆρος αὐλός, 
see D. L. Couprie, “πρηστῆρος αὐλός Revisited,” Apeiron 34 (2001): 195–204.  
I am not committed to any one reading of this phrase, but only to the fact that 
it is an image.  Graham, Texts, 68, accepts Couprie’s reading, while still calling 
Anaximander’s language in G.Axr.22–28 “another daring analogy.” 
90 Pseudo-Plutarch, Miscellanies, 2 (G.Axr.19). 
91  Aëtius, P 5.19.4 (G.Axr.37).  Compare Censorinus, 4.7 (G.Axr.38); 
Plutarch, Symposium, 730e (G.Axr.39). 
92 Simplicius, Physics, 24.20–21 (< G.Axr.9). 
93 Agathemerus, 1.1 (G.Axr.6)  
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was geographical, i.e. a map.94  Hecataeus is said to have revised it into 
“a thing to be wondered at” (θαυμασθῆναι τὸ πρᾶγμα). 95   And 
Diogenes Laertius’s description of Anaximander’s map tells us why it 
could become such a wonder: “he drew the surrounding of both earth 
and sea, but even fashioned96 a sphere,” presumably of the surrounding 
heavens.97  The sense of balance and equality in Anaximander’s map also 
pervades his account of change (μεταβολή) generally.  This is evident 
in the sole surviving, extended fragment, where Anaximander describes 
the process of generation (γένεσις) and destruction (φθορά) as 
“necessarily” (κατὰ τὸ χρεών) one of “giving judgment and paying the 
penalty to one another for injustice in accordance with the order of 
time.”98  Not only does this fragment show the pervasive influence of 
Anaximander’s desire for balance, it also shows a link between his 
thought and Thales’ appraisal of his wisdom.  Thales claimed that water 
is the ἀρχή of all things out of a desire to unite the basis of his political 
and natural sciences.  And Anaximander gleaned in the balance and 
regularity of the heavens and of the change of opposites the same 
balance and regularity in the back and forth of crime and punishment.99  
The collapse of the political and the natural in Thales’ practical 
94 Strabo, Geographica, 1.1.11 (G.Axr.7). 
95  Agathemerus, 1.1 (G.Axr.6); compare Strabo, Geographica, 1.1.11 
(G.Axr.7). 
96 One manuscript has ἐποίησε where the others have κατεσκεύασε. 
97 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, 
2.2.  For an amazing attempt at reconstructing Anaximander’s model, see D. L. 
Couprie, “The Visualization of Anaximander’s Astronomy,” Apeiron 28 (1995): 
159–81.  Waterfield, First Philosophers, 3, notes “the grandeur and splendor of 
[the Milesians’] geometric visions of the universe.” 
98 Simplicius, Physics, 24.18–21 (< G.Axr.9): διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ 
τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν.  Immediately 
following, Simplicius explicitly understands this as an account of μεταβολή. 
99 Heidegger, Beginning, 10–11, gives a persuasive argument against what 
he calls the “juridical-moral” interpretation of this fragment.  While much of 
what Heidegger says of Anaximander is similar to my own view, nevertheless 
Anaximander’s expansion of juridical-moral terms to being as such cannot be 
viewed in isolation from his extension of other imagery—of pipes, wheels, and 
whistles.  So we cannot ignore the tension between the Anaximander who 
delves into the Being of beings, as Heidegger shows us, and the Anaximander 
who speaks in images—between Anaximander the scientist and Anaximander 
the artist.  (Against Heidegger’s example of ἄδικος ἵππος, see Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics 1.1.)  Also attuned to this problem or connection are 
McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates, 64; Vlastos, Studies, 56–57, 73–83; 
Waterfield, First Philosophers, 5–6. 
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capabilities as both statesman and engineer persists in Anaximander’s 
artistic natural science.  It is of Thales’ slide along the range of τὸ 
καλόν, from his governance of human beings to a governance of the 
κόσμος, that Anaximander paints his picture. 
Anaximander’s debt to Thales thus seems deeper than a shared 
interest in cosmology.  With his map, his similes, and his puns, 
Anaximander paints a portrait of Thales’ wisdom.  Herodotus, better 
traveled than Anaximander and so a bit more down to earth with his 
geography, says of maps like this Milesian’s: 
I laugh when I see many who have drawn a map (περιόδους) of the 
earth until now, since not even one of them orders (ἐξηγησάμενον) 
things in a manner possessed of mind.  They draw the ocean around 
the earth, which is circular, as though from a compass, while they 
make Asia equal to Europe.100 
We can further connect Herodotus’s remark to a parallel point in 
Hesiod.  After listing the Okeanids at length, Hesiod says it would be 
vexing to go through all of them, though the locals know their names; 
yet in the sequel he quickly accounts for the celestial bodies and the 
winds that guide human life.101  Around us we find ineffable contingency, 
above us formal consistency.  For Hesiod, we look upward to the skies 
for guidance only because we are confronted with the unpredictability 
of the earth around us.  Despite their regularity, the heavens give only 
partial guidance to Hesiod’s audience of farmers and herders.  In light 
of this partiality, Hesiod invokes the distinction between divine and 
human knowledge. 102   Anaximander, however, projects the heaven’s 
order down onto the world around him.  As with Thales, Anaximander’s 
claim to have unproblematic access to a unified ἀρχή of all things 
necessitates a denial of this Hesiodic distinction, so that—again, as with 
Thales—divine providence gives way to human.103  We therefore have 
100 Herodotus, Histories, 4.36.2 (G.Axr.8).  Kahn, Anaximander, 83, takes 
Hecataeus’s map to be a correction of Anaximander’s, with Herodotus making 
oblique reference to the superior map of Hecataeus.  But because Herodotus 
refers to the use of a compass and the assumption of an equality of parts, his 
laughter seems to be directed generally against mathematical balance as 
representative of geographic reality.  Thus Herodotus immediately goes into a 
description of Asia and Libya that emphasizes not just their difference in size, 
but their irregularity as well (see 4.37–42). 
101 Hesiod, Theogony, 346–74. 
102 Hesiod, Works and Days, 458–92. 
103  Waterfield, First Philosophers, 5–6, explores the possibility of 
Anaximander’s views of divine providence. 
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the same choice with Anaximander as we did with Thales.  Either we 
can attempt a more consistent theory, in this case by addressing the 
problem of access to the indefinite ground of the definition we 
experience, or we can restore Hesiod’s distinction.  As we will soon see, 
the only way to address that problem will be through just such a 
restoration.  In this case, progress entails a return. 
IV 
Conclusion.  The legacy of Milesian thought extends far beyond the 
above reflections.  To include Anaximander’s views on psychology and 
theology would further illustrate the extent of his relation to Thales.  
Likewise, much could be said about how Anaximenes uses wind to unify 
the ground and cause of the κόσμος in a way Anaximander did not, or 
about Hecataeus’s map as a magnification of Anaximander’s.  And of 
course what the preceding might say about the trajectory from these 
early Milesians to Xenophanes and the great Parmenides would likely 
shed light on the quasi-theological critique of cosmology in what the 
latter’s goddess reveals to him.  But the aim of the present paper has 
been to investigate the origin and foundations of Milesian thought, so as 
to assess the contours philosophy took in its first steps on the road out 
of the prephilosophic, human κόσμος of political life and into its proper 
domain.  And in the course of that investigation, we have seen a common 
problem emerge, that the high estimation of the power of human 
wisdom has come at the expense of the coherence of each thinker’s 
ἀρχή. 
The lack of coherence in Thales showed itself in the mixed results 
of his knowledge of τὸ κινητικόν.  With this art, Thales claimed to be 
able to produce out of a disorder a κόσμος among men and things alike, 
though the vastness of his vision ironically obscured from him the things 
beneath his feet.  But Thales’ error could very well have been an 
accident of man and time.  Here Anaximander’s thought proves 
instructive.  The aim of Thales’ art was the production of a definite order 
out of an indefinite disorder.  For Anaximander, the balance and 
equilibrium of the κόσμος comes from the indefinite principle he names 
τὸ ἄπειρον.  Anaximander shows us, then, how the ἀρχή of all things 
makes such an art possible.  But as Aristotle notes, τὸ ἄπειρον always 
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shows itself as other than what it itself is.104  To attempt to grab hold of 
this indefinite ground in the way Thales and Anaximander would like is 
to misunderstand how that ground is of necessity elusive.  For, again, 
the very nature of τὸ ἄπειρον is to become something definite, to cease 
to be what it is.  Whether willingly or not, then, Anaximander shows us 
that we can master the element of our experience that appears 
disorderly only through access to what is beyond our experience, to 
what is unapparent.  Access to the disorderly ground of this order thus 
means speaking about what is other than our experience in terms of our 
experience.  It means speaking in images, speaking poetically. 105  
Anaximander, in painting a picture of Thales’ wisdom, shows the ground 
of his predecessor’s stumble.  Far from demythologizing the Hesiodic 
worldview, then, they have only swapped stories for similes.  Speaking 
Platonically, Anaximander’s sketch is an εἰκὸς μῦθος.106 
104 Aristotle, Physics 3.5.204b32–35. 
105 Thus Schofield, “Ionians,” 54, rightly understands τὸ ἄπειρον as “what 
necessarily lies outside our experience of space and time,” though he does not 
see this view as a philosophical problem.  Though this may not be his intention, 
Graham, Texts, 69, uses language that beautifully captures Anaximander’s 
significance: “our overall understanding of Anaximander may depend on 
whether we see him as essentially drawing on biological analogies . . . , or on 
technological analogies (the chariot wheel, the columns drum), or on social-
political analogies (the judgment of time).  But indeed he uses all of these kinds 
of analogies to build his picture of the world, and his conception is more than 
the sum of its parts” (emphasis mine).  Whether Anaximander knows it or not, 
something like the connection between image and concept is latently at play in 
his thought. 
106 Plato, Timaeus 68d2.  Cornford, “Ionian Philosophy,” 70, observes that 
“the philosopher . . . appears as the rationalizing successor of the poet-seer, 
relying on the outset on the traditional wisdom, confirmed by his own inward 
conviction.  On the other hand, his rationalism was to bring him later into 
conflict with those two other figures, who had been taking their separate ways.”  
Despite his rationalism, the philosopher still had to discover the possibility of 
what Plato’s Eleatic stranger calls φανταστική, an art of spoken images 
(εἴδωλα λεγόμενα) through which the false appears true, that is, an art of 
poetic speech that hides its poetic character (compare Plato, Sophist 234c2–
236b3).  Contrasting Anaximander’s generally mathematical approach to 
describing the structure of the world with Hesiod’s description of Tartaros, 
Kahn, Anaximander, 82, notes of the latter that “it would be hopeless to draw 
a diagram to accompany such a description.  The poetic Tartarus is vividly and 
dramatically conceived.  A diagram, however, requires not drama but a precise 
geometric arrangement.”  This pregnant insight explains why it’s in his 
descriptions of motion that Anaximander is either unclear, as with the initial 
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For his part, Hesiod seems to have been all too aware of this 
problem, for he discloses it in his Theogony in poetic form through the 
juxtaposition of the Titanomachy and Typhonomachy.  In the 
Titanomachy, Zeus frees Kronos’s brothers, the hundred-handers, and 
requests their help battling Kronos, his father and their original 
imprisoner.107  Zeus’s action thus appears to be an example of his justice, 
and so is followed by a description of the order Zeus imposes on the 
otherwise disorderly Tartaros.108  But because Zeus did not need the aid 
of the Titans to defeat Kronos, 109  they instead seem to have been 
necessary only in order to give his defeat of Kronos the appearance of 
justice.  Far from taking a just stand against Kronos’s monstrosity, 
Zeus’s defeat of Kronos is itself monstrous.  Hesiod thus teaches us that 
the imposition of an order onto disorder, as an imposition, is a willful 
suppression of the will.  The apparent order of Zeus’s justice thus has 
its ground in an unapparent disorder of will against will.  Hesiod 
discloses this ground in the Typhonomachy, where Zeus fights fire with 
fire, defeating his cacophonously disordered equal, Typhoeus. 110  
Hesiod’s Zeus thus shows himself as other than he is, for his just order, 
apparently guided by mind,111 has its ground in a will that, as mere will, 
is indifferent to justice: his flames cannot be differentiated from those 
of Typhoeus.112  Hesiod thus demonstrates that because an order comes 
into being—either through an initial genesis or through its constant 
reaffirmation despite changes in time—all order is derivative of a prior 
disorder as the source from which it comes into being and back into 
which it perishes.  That is, Hesiod, too, views the κόσμος as Thales and 
Anaximander will come to after him.  What Thales saw as τὸ κινητικόν 
and Anaximander named τὸ ἄπειρον Hesiod, and Homer with him, 
ἀπόκρισις in his cosmogony, or poetic, as with his punning descriptions of his 
cosmogony, zoogony, and anthropogony. 
107 Hesiod, Theogony, 617–63.  The interpretation of Hesiod here advanced 
is borrowed from my longer study, found in Alex Priou, “Hesiod: Man, Law and 
Cosmos,” POLIS: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 31 (2014): 
233–60.  I refer the reader there for a more nuanced account. 
108 Hesiod, Theogony, 720–819.  When Tartaros comes into being, Hesiod 
refers to him in the plural and calls him murky (see ibid., 119). 
109 See ibid., 687. 
110 Ibid., 836–37. 
111 See Hesiod, Works and Days, 105, 267–69. 
112 See Hesiod, Theogony, 842–46. 
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called the βουλή of Zeus.113  Zeus’s βουλή, in the sense of “will,” takes 
an indefinite form which only shows itself as a definite, particular 
βουλή, in the sense of “plan,” and so exhibits the same elusive duality 
as the indeterminate ground of the respective ἀρχαί of Thales and 
Anaximander.  
Contrary to Thales and Anaximander, however, Hesiod 
understands this problem fundamentally to be the one of providence.  
Because Zeus’s mind is comprehensive, his βουλή is beyond human 
comprehension: the specific form Zeus’s just order takes is 
unpredictable from our perspective. 114   Fundamental to Hesiod’s 
thought, therefore, is the distinction between human and divine 
wisdom.  Thales and Anaximander obliterate this distinction, so as to do 
away with the problem of access to the ground of things.  But in the end, 
Thales’ practical competence does not measure up to his ambitions, so 
that his engineering of physical things and his governance of human 
beings remain at a remove from one another: Thales the statesman and 
Thales the philosopher are not, in the end, one.  And while 
Anaximander’s critique of Thales may disclose the properly 
indeterminate ground of determinate things, he paves over that 
otherness through the poetic blurring of the indeterminate, inaccessible 
ground and its determinate expression: in Anaximander the scientist’s 
blush we find Anaximander the artist.  Thales and Anaximander replace 
Zeus’s providence with their own.  They do not so much demythologize 
Hesiod as they mythologize themselves.  Such seems to be the 
consequence of not questioning, but attempting to perfect and complete 
the political community, from which the Milesian road extended and to 
which Thales and Anaximander speak no less than the Hesiodic.  
Anaximander’s portrait of the balance and equilibrium Thales’ wisdom 
produces contains a distant echo of Cleobolus’s inscription on Midas’s 
tomb, an echo of the claim to have discovered or established a 
permanence in the κόσμος.  That the myths collapse only goes to show 
that one can ignore the problem of access to the ground of experience, 
to what shows itself only as what is other than itself, only at the price of 
becoming oneself problematic. 
113 Compare Hesiod, Catalogue of Women, frag. 204.96–100 with frag. 1 
(compare Cypria, frag. 1); Homer, Iliad, 1.1–7, 2.1–5, 8.469–83, 15.47–77. 
114 Compare Hesiod, Works and Days, 458–92. 
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Of course, to what extent Thales and Anaximander were in reality 
aware of this problem is hard to assess, since the erosion of time may 
well have scrubbed their thought free of its original nuance and irony.  
Nevertheless, the first thinker whose writings’ fragments and testimony 
evince a philosophic, rather than poetic, formulation of this problem is 
Heraclitus.  For Heraclitus, the unity of all things is not some single 
determinate thing as with Thales, nor some basic indeterminacy to 
which we unproblematically have access as with Anaximander, but, as 
we have already touched upon, a sort of φύσις—a nature, growing, or 
self-showing—that delights in hiding itself.115  It is an elusive intention 
or thought (γνώμη) that both does and does not want to be called the 
name of Zeus.116  This echo of the Hesiodic distinction between Zeus’s 
just order and his disorderly will resounds further in Heraclitus’s 
identification of the unity of all things with fire.  For despite the 
indeterminacy of Heraclitean fire, it is kindled and extinguished into and 
out of the determinate measures available to us through experience—a 
paradoxical combination of unity and multiplicity, disagreement and 
agreement, dissonance and consonance, disputation and conversation, 
and bow and lyre.117  Aware of the limits of human wisdom, Heraclitus 
speaks to the difficulty of putting into determinate words what is of 
necessity indeterminate; one stumbles into formulations that risk the 
twin sins of contradiction and imagery.118  Whether Heraclitus thinks this 
difficulty can be overcome—and if so, how—is of course beyond the 
purview of the present paper.  What can be said, however, is that 
Heraclitus emerges for us as Hesiod’s true heir, the first to confront the 
prephilosophic worldview on its own terms.  Though he may not be the 
first philosopher, he nevertheless appears to be the first to formulate 
the problem of philosophy philosophically, rather than poetically.  In 
this respect, he paints a truer portrait of Thales’ wisdom than 
Anaximander did: our relation to the ground of things is not one of direct 
access, but of a mediated approach at once disputatious and 
conciliatory, an approach Heraclitus punningly names ἀγχιβασίη.119 
Kutztown University 
115  Heraclitus, M8 (DK 123). 
116 Heraclitus, M85 (DK 41), M84 (DK 32). 
117 Heraclitus, M51 (DK 30), M25 (DK 10), M111 (DK 122), M27 (DK 51). 
118 Heraclitus, M1 (DK 1). 
119 Heraclitus, M111 (DK 122). 
                                                     
